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#mfa

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🆕 blog! “FobCam '25 - All my MFA tokens on one page”

Some ideas are timeless. Back in 2004, an anonymous genius set up "FobCam". Tired of having to carry around an RSA SecurID token everywhere, our hero simply left the fob at home with an early webcam pointing at it. And then left the page open for all to see.

Security expert Bruce…

👀 Read more: shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/04/fobca

#2fa #CyberSecurity #MFA #Satire(Probably) #security

A padlock engraved into a circuit board.
Terence Eden’s Blog · FobCam '25 - All my MFA tokens on one page
More from Terence Eden

(sophos.com) Evilginx: How Attackers Bypass MFA Through Adversary-in-the-Middle Attacks news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/03/

A short descriptive article about Evilginx and how stealing credentials work, a few suggested ways of detecting etc.

Summary:
This article examines Evilginx, a tool that leverages the legitimate nginx web server to conduct Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) attacks that can bypass multifactor authentication (MFA). The tool works by proxying web traffic through malicious sites that mimic legitimate services like Microsoft 365, capturing not only usernames and passwords but also session tokens. The article demonstrates how Evilginx operates, showing how attackers can gain full access to a user's account even when protected by MFA. It provides detection methods through Azure/Microsoft 365 logs and suggests both preemptive and reactive mitigations, emphasizing the need to move toward phishing-resistant FIDO2-based authentication methods.

Sophos News · Stealing user credentials with evilginxA malevolent mutation of the widely used nginx web server facilitates Adversary-in-the-Middle action, but there’s hope

AU Tech folk: Which provider do you recommend for registering .au domains (eg .com.au, .org.au, .au etc)?

Second question. Do they currently support Multi-factor Authentication, specifically MFA TOTP (eg using an Auth App)?

Looking for alternatives to VentraIP as it's currently the only .au registra I know of that offers MFA TOTP.

New Privacy Guides article 🔑✨
by me:

If you are using a YubiKey,

you might get in some situations where you need to reset your key to factory default, and/or set up a backup of it on a spare key.

This tutorial will guide you
through each step to reset and back up your YubiKey successfully, with clear instructions and plenty of visual support.

I hope you find it helpful!

privacyguides.org/articles/202

🆕 blog! “Towards a test-suite for TOTP codes”

Because I'm a massive nerd, I actually try to read specification documents. As I've ranted ad nauseam about the current TOTP spec being irresponsibly obsolete.

The three major implementations of the spec - Google, Apple, and Yubico - all subtly disagree on how it should be implemented. Every other MFA…

👀 Read more: shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/03/towar

#2fa #CyberSecurity #HTOP #MFA #OpenSource #totp

Terence Eden’s Blog · Towards a test-suite for TOTP codes
More from Terence Eden

Towards a test-suite for TOTP codes

shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/03/towar

Because I'm a massive nerd, I actually try to read specification documents. As I've ranted ad nauseam about the current TOTP0 spec being irresponsibly obsolete.

The three major implementations of the spec - Google, Apple, and Yubico - all subtly disagree on how it should be implemented. Every other MFA app has their own idiosyncratic variants. The official RFC is infuriatingly vague. That's no good for a security specification. Multiple implementations are great, multiple interpretations are not.

So I've built a nascent test suite - you can use it to see if your favourite app can correctly implement the TOTP standard.

Please do contribute tests and / or feedback.

Here's what the standard actually says - see if you can find apps which don't implement it correctly.

Background

Time-based One Time Passwords are based on HOTP - HMAC-Based One-Time Password.

HOTP uses counters; a new password is regularly generated. TOTP uses time as the counter. At the time of writing this post, there have been about 1,740,800,000 seconds since the UNIX Epoc. So a TOTP with an period of 30 seconds is on counter (1,740,800,000 ➗ 30) = 58,026,666. Every 30 seconds, that counter increments by one.

Number of digits

How many digits should your 2FA token have? Google says 6 or 8. YubiCo graciously allows 7. Why those limits? Who knows!?

The HOTP specification gives an example of 6 digits. The example generates a code of 0x50ef7f19 which, in decimal, is 1357872921. It then takes the last 6 digits to produce the code 872921.

The TOTP RFC say:

Basically, the output of the HMAC-SHA-1 calculation is truncated to obtain user-friendly values 1.2. Background

But doesn't say how far to truncate.

There's nothing I can see in the spec that prevents an implementer using all 10. The HOTP spec, however, does place a minimum requirement - but no maximum:

Implementations MUST extract a 6-digit code at a minimum and possibly 7 and 8-digit code. Depending on security requirements, Digit = 7 or more SHOULD be considered in order to extract a longer HOTP value. RFC 4226 - 5.3. Generating an HOTP Value

(As a minor point, the first digit is restricted to 0-2, so being 10 digits long isn't significantly stronger than 9 digits.)

Is a 4 digit code acceptable? The security might be weaker, but the usability is greater. Most apps will allow a one digit code to be returned. If no digits are specified, what should the default be?

Algorithm

The given algorithm in the HOTP spec is SHA-1.

In order to create the HOTP value, we will use the HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm RFC 4226 - 5.2. Description

As we now know, SHA-1 has some fundamental weaknesses. The spec comments (perhaps somewhat naïvely) about SHA-1:

The new attacks on SHA-1 have no impact on the security of HMAC-SHA-1. RFC 4226 - B.2. HMAC-SHA-1 Status

I daresay that's accurate. But the TOTP authors disagree and allow a for some different algorithms to be used. The specification for HMAC says:

HMAC can be used with any iterative cryptographic hash function, e.g., MD5, SHA-1 [Emphasis added] RFC 2104 - HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication

So most TOTP implementation allow SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512.

TOTP implementations MAY use HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SHA-512 functions […] instead of the HMAC-SHA-1 function that has been specified for the HOTP computation RFC 6238 - TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm

But the HOTP spec goes on to say:

Current candidates for such hash functions include SHA-1, MD5, RIPEMD-128/160. These different realizations of HMAC will be denoted by HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-MD5, HMAC-RIPEMD RFC 2104 - Introduction

So, should your TOTP app be able to handle an MD5 HMAC, or even SHA3-384? Will it? If no algorithm is specified, what should the default be?

Period

As discussed, this is what increments the counter for HOTP. The Google Spec says:

The period parameter defines a period that a TOTP code will be valid for, in seconds. The default value is 30.

The TOTP RFC says:

We RECOMMEND a default time-step size of 30 seconds 5.2. Validation and Time-Step Size

It doesn't make sense to have a negative number of second. But what about one second? What about a thousand? Lots of apps artificially restrict TOTP codes to 15, 30, or 60 seconds. But there's no specification to define a maximum or minimum value.

A user with mobility difficulties or on a high-latency connection probably wants a 5 minute validity period. Conversely, machine-to-machine communication can probably be done with a single-second (or lower) time period.

Secret

Google says the secret is

an arbitrary key value encoded in Base32 according to RFC 3548. The padding specified in RFC 3548 section 2.2 is not required and should be omitted.

Whereas Apple says it is:

An arbitrary key value encoded in Base32. Secrets should be at least 160 bits.

Can a shared secret be a single character? What about a thousand? Will padding characters cause a secret to be rejected or can they be safely stripped?

Label

The label allows you to have multiple codes for the same service. For example Big Bank:Personal Account and Big Bank:Family Savings. The Google spec is slightly confusing:

The issuer prefix and account name should be separated by a literal or url-encoded colon, and optional spaces may precede the account name. Neither issuer nor account name may themselves contain a colon.

What happens if they are not URl encoded? What about Matrix accounts which use a colon in their account name? Why are spaces allowed to precede the account name? Is there any practical limit to the length of these strings?

If no label is specified, what should the default be?

Issuer

Google says this parameter is:

Strongly Recommended The issuer parameter is a string value indicating the provider or service this account is associated with, URL-encoded according to RFC 3986. If the issuer parameter is absent, issuer information may be taken from the issuer prefix of the label. If both issuer parameter and issuer label prefix are present, they should be equal.

Apple merely says:

The domain of the site or app. The password manager uses this field to suggest credentials when setting up a new code generator.

Yubico equivocates with

The issuer parameter is recommended, but it can be absent. Also, the issuer parameter and issuer string in label should be equal.

If it isn't a domain, will Apple reject it? What happens if the issuer and the label don't match?

Next Steps

  • If you're a user, please contribute tests or give feedback.
  • If you're a developer, please check your app conforms to the specification.
  • If you're from Google, Apple, Yubico, or another security company - wanna help me write up a proper RFC so this doesn't cause issues in the future?
  1. Time-based One Time Passwords. Not the TV show you remember from your youth, grandad. ↩︎

Terence Eden’s Blog · Towards a test-suite for TOTP codes
More from Terence Eden

Delta Airlines recently announced that they added MFA, to both their site and their app.
👍

But the only options are ones that require connectivity (SMS, email, push).
👎

I have zero interest in making managing my travel ... dependent on whether various networks are up.

If security people can immediately think of common threat models that make them want to avoid your MFA entirely, due to core aspects of your business offering ... some stakeholders were missing (or overridden) in those meetings.

I recently saw an interesting thread elsewhere: someone expressing high frustration with two factor/multifactor authentication in their day to day life, and nearly every response being of agreement, sometimes very vehement. I don’t think most of these people worked in infosec or IT. Some were dealing with MFA on university systems, some on work systems. They all loathed it. But the why expressed by many for the loathing was what was really interesting. Sure, many expressed irritation about being interrupted multiple times a day by MFA prompts, some were annoyed that it was in place for what they saw as systems that “didn’t need to be that secure”, etc. The common refrains one hears from people in security awareness discussions and/or about less user friendly implementations. But the broadest sentiment?

That it didn’t matter because their PII - their SSNs, their credit card numbers, so on and so forth - had already been stolen so many times, that nothing was really being done to stop that from happening, that it was happening more and more and the companies responsible for losing the data weren’t being punished. In the face of all that, they didn’t want to have to keep dealing with the pain of being forced to use MFA when they felt it wasn’t helping anything,

Replied in thread

@Tarah : MFA sucks. Alex Weinert wrote in _2019_, in techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5:

A few days ago, our team helped someone who had been a target of account takeover (ATO). Despite protecting the account with mandatory two-step verification using SMS and the Authenticator app, attackers had broken into the account and changed the password.

MFA had failed.

Every idiot can now hire an "Evil Proxy" service (using EvilGinx2 or similar).

Watch the animated GIF's in phishify.nl/phishing-blog/aitm (such as phishify.nl/img/aitm-phishing.).

We need to fix the web (infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat) instead of hanging on to old and failing (heise.de/en/news/Microsoft-Pro) technology with flawed implementations (usenix.org/conference/usenixse).

And we need better passkeys (infosec.exchange/@ErikvanStrat).

@dangoodin
@conorgil

#MFA#2FA#AitM
Continued thread

But wait… Now that I've got you thinking about whether it's OK for a web site to prompt you to change an expired password before requiring you to enter your MFA, have you considered that most sites with MFA that allow you to reset your password via an email link don't make you enter your MFA before letting you reset the password?
#infosec #MFA #2FA

I let my password expire on #myPay, the U.S. government's wage payment portal, and so it prompted me to change my password on my next login.
It prompted me after I entered my username and old password, but _before_ prompting me to enter my #MFA token.
Is this behavior correct?
#2FA #infosec #poll #FedLife

Replied in thread

@GossiTheDog : it's not the lack of MFA that is the problem.

Problem 1) is that a SPOF (*) is permitted access to data of millions (either directly or indirectly). This risk includes compromise of client devices.

2) Weak MFA (+) does not prevent these attacks, because the SPOF may be phished into entering their credentials in a third party page that imitates the intended Citrix Netscaler.

Please do not promote a flawed fix for bad passwords (2019: techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5).

(*) Single Point Of Failure

(+) SMS, Voice, TOTP, Number Matchting, Location

TECHCOMMUNITY.MICROSOFT.COMAll your creds are belong to us!Multi-factor Authentication (MFA) matters. 

It’s still October, so that means it’s also still #cybersecurity awareness month.

Here are my basic tips for everyone:

1. Develop good password management skills. Avoiding reusing passwords. Use long + complex passwords. Change default passwords. Use a password manager.

2. Enable #MFA.

3. Keep #software and firmware updated. Generally, this involves avoiding using EOL/deprecated software.

#security

avoidthehack.com/getting-start

T-Mobile reaches $31.5 million settlement with FCC over past data breaches

Apparently, T-mobile is now mandated to implement better cybersecurity controls, such as properly segmenting networks and using phishing resistant #MFA.

This settlement covers the breaches in 2021, 2022, and 2023. Will we get a 2024 special? 💀

#cybersecurity #infosec #databreach

cyberscoop.com/t-mobile-fcc-se

CyberScoop · T-Mobile reaches $31.5 million settlement with FCC over past data breaches By Derek B. Johnson

Hoe de Politiehack precies heeft plaatsgevonden, weet ik niet.

Wel weet ik dat veel "experts"hun kop in het zand steken of mij zelfs voor gek verklaren als ik schrijf dat:

1) Het opzet is dat mensen op internet nep niet van echt kunnen onderscheiden (security.nl/posting/859906/Spe), en dat daar *dringend* iets aan gedaan moet worden;

2) Zij aanraden om zwakke MFA (security.nl/posting/859561/MFA) te gebruiken in plaats van een wachtwoordmanager die op domeinnamen checkt;

3) Onder hen er *zelfs* zijn die stellen dat we, op *dit* internet, EDIW veilig zouden kunnen gebruiken (reactie op een posting van Ivo Jansch, één van de architecten van EDIW: tweakers.net/nieuws/204138/#r_). Welliswaar met de opmerking dat er alternatieven moeten blijven bestaan (die er nu ook niet meer zijn voor communicatie met de overheid of met uw bank).

Zie ook security.nl/posting/827137/Kop, bovenaan die pagina en security.nl/posting/833217/Int.

#Politiehack #Politie #MFA #2FA #ZwakkeMFA #Zwakke2FA #DV #Certificaten #LetsEncrypt #LetsAuthenticateTheWebsiteFirst #AitM #MitM #Phishing #EvilProxy #PhaaS #Evilginx2 #EDIW #EUDIW #EC #KopieID #KopietjePaspoort #VideoIdent

(Bron van onderstaand plaatje: maxvandaag.nl/sessies/themas/m)